We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated by the solution of a partial differential equation called the master equation. Moreover, we analyze the fluctuations of the empirical measure of the states of the players in the game and show that it is governed by a solution to a stochastic differential equation. Finally, we prove the regularity of the master equation, which is required for the above results.
Introduction
We consider a finite horizon game in continuous-time with weakly interacting n-players over a finite state space. Each player controls its own rate of transition from its state to another one, aiming to minimize a cost. The value function for each player is defined via a symmetric Nashequilibrium. We associate the game with a partial differential equation, known as the master equations. Then we show that the solution of this equation gives an O(n −1 ) approximation to the value function. Finally, we provide stochastic differential equation that governs the limit behavior of the fluctuations of the empirical measure of the game.
The theory of mean-field games (MFGs) was initiated a decade ago with the independent seminal work of Lasry and Lions [23, 24, 25] , and Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [16, 15] . This field studies limiting models for weakly interacting n-player stochastic games. The research in this area involves the analysis of the limiting model as well as the convergence of the n-player games to it. The convergence was analyzed from several point of views. First, by showing that an optimal control from the MFG can be used in the n-player game in order to generate an asymptotic Nash equilibrium, see e.g., [3] and [5] . Lacker [21, 22] and Fischer [13] proved a every two players with the same index (one from each game) share the exact same noise. a more sophisticated coupling construction is required in the finite state setup. In fact, in the diffusion case, loosely speaking, the characterization of the fluctuations follows from two of the shelf results: the two empirical measures described above, which in this case are coupled trivially, are close to each other by order O(n −1 ) according to [4] and the second result due to [20] characterizes the fluctuations of the second one. A rigorous analysis of the fluctuations in many player games as well as the derivation of large deviation and concentration inequalities are studied by Delarue, Lacker, and Ramanan, [9] . For the second step we associate every state with arrival and departure processes. By scaling them and using tightness arguments in addition to the martingale central limit theorem, we establish the stochastic differential equation limit. Benefiting from the fact that the number of states is finite , the fluctuations can be described as a solution to a stochastic differential equation, which argueably gives more intuition about the behavior of the system. In the diffusion case, the fluctuations limit is a solution to a stochastic partial differential equation. Finally, we show that a variant of the assumptions given in [14] is sufficient to get our results, which holds on an arbitrary time horizon. Our results therefore extend results from [14] to arbitrary time horizon. The above results above require regularity of the master equation, which we prove in the last section by constructing it from the coupled system of forward-backward partial differential equations that were described by [14] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study the n-player game; we introduce the game, the master equation associated with it, and provide the convergence results. In Section 3 we provide provide simple sufficient conditions for the results from Section 2 and establish the relationship between the master equation and the MFG.
Notation
We use the following notation. For every a, b ∈ R, a ∧ b = min{a, b} and a ∨ b = max{a, b}. We denote [0, ∞) by R+. The set of positive integers is denoted by N. For every d ∈ N and a, b ∈ R d , a · b denotes the usual scalar product, · denotes Euclidean norm, and a ⊤ is the transpose of a. {e 1 , . . . , e d } is the standard basis of R d . Also, set e xz = e z − e x . For any k ∈ N, the set {1, . . . , k} is denoted by [k] ; throughout the paper we will take k = d, n. 2 The n-player game and the MFG
The stochastic model
We consider a finite state continuous-time symmetric n-player game with weak interaction. The players' positions can be any of the states [d] , where d is an integer greater than one. At every time instant each of the players chooses the rate of transition from its own state to the others, aiming to minimize a cost; both the transition rates and the cost depend on the current time, the player's state, and the empirical distribution of the players over the states.
We now give a precise description of the controlled stochastic processes of interest. Fix a finite horizon T > 0. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space that supports unit rate independent Poisson processes P n,i,x , n ∈ N, i ∈ [n], x ∈ [d]. The controlled jump process (X n,i (t)) t∈[0,T ] , which stands for players i's state, is taking values in [d] and is defined through P n,i,x , x ∈ [d], in a way that X n,i jumps to state x whenever the Cox processP n,i,x , which is introduced below, jumps. At time zero, the random variables {X n,i (0)} n i=1 are randomized independently from each other, each according to a distribution µ n 0 , where we assume that lim n→∞ µ n 0 exists in distribution. The Markovian control of player i is denoted by (a n,i (t, X n (t−))) t∈[0,T ] , where
). This process takes values in R d , such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] and every x = X n,i (t−), a n,i x (t) ∈ R + represents player i's rate of transition from its current state to state x. Also, we set a
x (t, X n (t−)). We require that the control processes {a n,i } n,i are suitably non-anticipative.
More rigorously, we assume that there is a filtration {F t } on (Ω, F, P), for which for every i ∈ [n], a n,i is {F t }-progressively measurable, the state X n,i , is {F t }-adapted, and for every n ∈ N, i ∈ [n], and
The latter is an {F t }-martingales with the predictable quadratic variations:
2) where δ ij,xy = 1 if i = j and x = y and 0 otherwise. Notice that according to (2.1), the Poisson process P n,i,x is "not active" while a n,i
x ≤ 0. By our definition of the control, the last inequality obviously holds during the time the process X n,i equals x. The process a n = {a n,i } n i=1 will be referred to as an admissible control.
The empirical distribution of the states of the players in the set [n] \ {i} at time t is given by
where hereafter the parameters i, j, and k represent a player and belong to [n] . Moreover, j,j =i stands for j∈[n],j =i . Also, denote
The total expected cost for player i starting at time t, associated with the initial condi-
) and the profile of Markovian strategies a = (a n,1 , . . . , a n,n ) is given by,
is the terminal cost. For every (x, η), the function a → f (x, η, a) is assumed to be independent of the x-th component of a. Also, f and g are measurable functions that will be required to satisfy additional conditions to be introduced in the sequel, see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, and Remark 2.2.
The goal of each player is to minimize its own cost J n,i . We are interested in finding an asymptotic Nash equilibrium.
The HJB equation
Consider the Hamiltonian
Throughout, the parameters x, y, and z represent a state of the system and belong to [d] . Also, y,y =x stands for y∈ [d] ,y =x . The following assumption requires a unique minimizer for the Hamiltonian.
Assumption 2.1 There is a unique (up to the x-th entry) measurable function a * :
We set a * x (x, η, p) = − y,y =x a * y (x, η, p). This assumption enables us to establish the uniqueness of the optimal response of any reference player to the other players' strategies, and in the MFG, which will be introduced in the next subsection, the optimal control of the decision maker. It is standard in the MFG literature, see [14, (5) The differential equations associated with this game are given in [14] and in [7] . However, for completeness of the presentation, we shortly illustrate its derivation. Fix i ∈ [n]. We refer to player i as a reference player. Assume that all the players in the set [n] \ {i} use the same control a n,−i . Denote the cost for player i who uses the control a in this case by J n,i a n,−i (t, x, η, a). Also, set
where the infimum is taken over controls a n,i such that the profile of strategies is admissible. Then V n,i solves
In a symmetric equilibrium we expect that the controls of all the players would be the same as the one of player i. That is, each player j ∈ [n] would use the same control:
The symmetry between the players yields also that V n,j = V n,i for every j ∈ [n], and hence, we denote V n = V n,i . Therefore, (2.3) becomes
where
The reason for the additional term 1 n−1 e yx in some of the places in (HJB(n)) is that η stands for the empirical measure of the other players from the point of view of player i. The additional term 1 n−1 e yx modifies it to the point of view of an arbitrary player whose state is y. In case y = x, e yx = 0 and therefore it remains η. Gomes et al. (2013) provide sufficient conditions for Assumption 2.1 to hold and for the existence and uniqueness of a solution of this system, in addition to equilibrium strategies, which we now summarize.
Lemma 2.1 [Proposition 1 and Theorems 4, 5, and 6 in [14] ] Suppose that the running cost f and the terminal cost g satisfy the following conditions.
(Lipschitzity)
The function f is differentiable with sepect to (w.r.t.) a and there exists a constant c L > 0 such that for every
2. (strong convexity) There exists a constant c V > 0 such that for every
Then, a. Assumption 2.1 holds and the function a * is uniformly Lipschitz in its arguments.
b. The Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz in its arguments over compact sets.
c. The system (HJB(n)) has a unique classical solution, which coincides with the value function associated with equilibrium strategies given by
The master equation and the MFG
In this section we present the master equation associated with the game described in the previous subsection. We provide heuristics for its derivation from both PDE and probabilistic perspectives. The MFG is fully analyzed in [14] . A rigorous derivation of the master equation from the MFG is given in Section 3. In the next subsection we focus on the relationship between the master equation and (HJB(n)), which is used to establish the fluctuations of the empirical measure in Section 2.5. The master equation associated with the n-player game is given by
Informally, the structure of the master equation follows from (HJB(n)) using the estimation
together with our setting
We now provide a probabilistic illustration of the master equation using a MFG problem. The MFG was studied by Gomes et al. in [14] and [8] and with an additional major player in [7] . Fix η ∈ P([d]) and a function α : [0, T ] → Q d×d , see Section 1.1. Using the terminologies from the n-player game, we consider a reference player, which we refer to as the decision maker (DM). The matrix α stands for the transition matrix of the non-reference players. Let
The function µ α represents the limit of the evolution in time of the distribution of the nonreference players. , such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] and every x = X(t), a x (t) is the transition rate from the current state X(t) to state x. Also, set a X(t) (t) = − x =X(t) a x (t). The total expected cost for the DM starting at time t, associated with the initial condition (X(t),
) and the control a is given by,
The value function is therefore given by
where the infimum is taken over a set of admissible controls, which we do not define rigorously.
The value function solves the following HJB
At the end of this subsection we provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system given in (2.7) and (2.8). This system gives,
The optimal control is thus given by
The MFG is obtained by taking α that satisfies
Hence, the forward-backward system is
. Finally, the master equation is driven by the second differential equation. [14] ] Under the assumptions from Lemma 2.1 there exists a solution to the system of equations given in (2.9). Moreover, under the following additional assumptions, we also have uniqueness.
Lemma 2.2 [Proposition 4 and Theorem 2 in

For any
3. There exists a positive parameter c H such that for every
Remark 2.1 [Section 2.8 in [14] ] Simple sufficient conditions for the assumptions above are
is the gradient of a convex function and that H can be rewritten as
with H 1 satisfying (2.10) and H 2 satisfying
is the gradient of a convex function.
Convergence of the value functions
We start by introducing key conditions that are necessary for all the results in the rest of Section 2. As we state below, some of the conditions are derived from the conditions given in Lemma 2.
1. Yet, we choose to state only the most primitive conditions that are necessary for the proofs.
The systems of the differential equations (HJB(n)) and (ME) have unique classical solutions.
The function
Denote c U := sup (t,x,η) |U (t, x, η)|, which is finite by the continuity of U over its compact domain.
3. Modifying c L if necessary, we assume that for every 
Remark 2.2 i. Recall that the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (HJB(n)) is guaranteed under the conditions from Lemma 2.1. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to (ME) as well as its properties are given in Section 3. Notice that the continuity of a * over the
implies that it is uniformly bounded above. Together with the third part of the assumption we get that there is a constant c B > 0 such that for every
The uniform lower bound of the optimal control appears also in [11, Definition 3.2.(iii)] and [8, Lemma 3] . It is somewhat equivalent to the requirement in the diffusion case that the diffusion coefficient, which drives the noise, is bounded away from zero. Such a condition holds if we restrict the controls to be greater than a given positive constant, or alternatively, if the running cost satisfies (2.5) with a x → 0 + . ii. In the light of (2.6), the uniform Lipschitz-continuity of ∇ η U is needed below in order to uniformly approximate D n,y,z U by ∂ ηz U . Kolokoltsov iii. Recall that the convergence results of Gomes et al. hold only if the horizon T is sufficiently small. This restriction emerges from their need that the functions {V n } n will be uniformly Lipschitz, see [14, Proposition 7] . Using the master equation to approximate the value function, we overpass this requirement and therefore can handle an arbitrary time horizon.
Consider the functions V n and U that solve (HJB(n)) and (ME), respectively. The next theorem provides an O(n −1 ) approximation to the value function in the n-player game. An equivalent result in the diffusion case was established in [4, Theorem 6.6]. 
Moreover, set x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , and define m n,i
Proof. Inequality (2.14) follows from (2.13), which we now prove. Fix i ∈ [n]. Let us denote a n,j
and for every t ∈ [t 0 , T ] and z ∈ [d],
and for every k = i,
Recall the definitions of P n,j,x and ρ n,j,x from (2.1) and the paragraph preceding it Now, applying Itô's formula to W n and using (HJB(n)) and (ME) we get that
Denote the last three -s by Ψ 1 (t)dt, Ψ 2 (t)dt, and Ψ 3 (t)dt, and the difference between the Hamiltonians by Ψ 4 (t)dt. Notice that
and therefore,
where we used the fact that for every j ∈ [n], B j,X n,j (t−) = 0. Taking integral on both sides of (2.15) and using W n (T, X n,i (T ), µ n,i (T )) = 0, we get that for every t ∈ [0, T ]
Recall the definition of B i,z , the bound 1/c B ≤ a * z , and (2.2). Squaring both sides of the above, taking expectation, using Jensen's inequality, and the martingale property of ρ n,i,z 's, we get, 16) where in the above expression, and in the rest of the proof, C refers to a finite positive constant that is independent of t and n and which can change from one line to the next. Now, notice that 
From Assumption 2.2.3, a * is uniformly bounded. Moreover, Assumption 2.2.2 and Lemma A.1, imply the uniform bound | (∂ ηz − D n,y,z ) U | ≤ C/n and thus, |Ψ 2 (t)| ≤ C n . Finally, Assumption 2.2.4 implies,
Recall that the random variables {X n,j (t−)} n j=1 and therefore also ∆ X n,j (t−) W n t, ·, µ n,j (t−) : j ∈ [n] are identically distributed. Therefore, the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of (2.16) is bounded above by
Using the bound E W n t, X n,i (t), µ n,i (t) 2 ≤ Cn −2 and repeating the above argument for
, we see that (2.17) holds with T replaced with T − δ. Proceeding recursively in this manner we have (2.13). ✷
Fluctuations of the empirical measure
In this section we provide the dynamics of the process √ n(µ n − µ) for some appropriate
is the empirical measure of the states of all the players. Throughout this subsection we assume that there exists
To establish the fluctuations, we start by coupling two jump processes whose transition rates are driven by the functions V n and U . They serve us to show that the difference between the empirical measures driven by these transition rates is of order O(n −1 ) and therefore we can restrict the fluctuations analysis to the dynamics that are driven by U . 
and consider a Cox process Q n,i with rate
We assume that the processes {Q n,i } i∈[n] satisfy
where δ ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Let
with the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. On the time interval [0, τ n,i ], whenever Q n,i jumps, the 2-dimensional process X n,i , Y n,i jumps to state
, with probability min{a X x (t), a Y x (t)}/a(t), x, X n,i (t−) , with probability
Notice that in the last two cases at most one of the processes X n,i and Y n,i jumps. On the time interval [τ n,i , T ] the processes X n,i and Y n,i move independently according to the transition rates (a X x (t) :
One can verify by induction over the jumps that the processes Q n,i , X n,i , and Y n,i , i ∈ [n], are well-defined. The next proposition provides an approximation of order O(n −1 ) to the empirical measure in the n-player game. We also consider the empirical measures of the states of all the players µ n , which is given in (2.18) and
e Y n,j (t) . 19) and as a consequence
Proof. The proof of (2.19) is the most demanding part, so we start with the other two. Inequality (2.20) merely follows from it, since
and (2.21) follows from (2.20) by Markov inequality. We now turn to proving (2.19). The first inequality follows since for every (x
|x j − y j | and since the processes {X n,j − Y n,j : j ∈ [n]} are identically distributed. The inequality above follows since the Euclidean norm is bounded by the L 1 norm for which the inequality is straightforward. Therefore, we now turn to proving the second inequality. From Construction 2.1 and the inequality 1 − e −x ≤ x, it follows that for every
Now, the Lipschitz-continuity of a * given in (2.12), implies that
By the definition of the operator ∆ y and since U is uniformly Lipschitz, we get that the last integral is bounded above by
where the equality follows by the symmetry of the players. The last bound applied to (2.22) together with (2.13) and Grönwall's inequality imply that there is a constant C > 0 such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] and n ≥ 2,
✷ The next theorem provides the fluctuations of the process µ n . In the light of (2.21), our proof will focus on the fluctuations of ν n . Therefore, we set the Q d×d valued function α * by
where pay attention that the operator ∆ x acts on U and not V n . Recall (2.9). Let µ(t), t ∈ [0, T ] be given by
, with the given initial condition µ(0) = µ 0 ∈ P ([d]) . Also, the following notation is necessary for the statement of the theorem. For every Q d×d valued function η → α(η), its gradient is a d × d matrix, whose xy component is the vector ∇ η α xy (η). For any vector c ∈ R d , the product c ⊗ ∇ η α(η) is a d × d matrix, whose xy component is the inner product c · ∇ η α xy (η). Finally, in order to establish the fluctuations we require convergence of the initial state of the system and some regularity of the optimal control a * .
Assumption 2.3 Modifying c L from Assumption 2.2 if necessary, we assume that for every
This condition follows easily if for example the running cost can be expressed as f (x, η, a) = f 1 (x, a) + f 2 (x, η) for some functions f 1 and f 2 , in which case, a * is independent of η, see also Example 3.1 below. The optimal control in this case a * (x, η, ∆ x U (t, ·, η) depends on the empirical measure only through the function U .
Theorem 2.2 Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the process √ n(µ n −µ) is stochastically bounded.
That is,
Moreover, if in addition Assumption 2.3 holds, then 
Proof. We start with the case that Assumption3.1 holds. The more general case is treated later. The SDE admits a unique solution since the dt component is linear in ψ and the terms of α * and ∇ η α * are bounded. We now turn to showing the convergence. First, note that by (2.21) it is sufficient to show that
, let A n x and S n x be the arrival and departure processes, respectively, associated with state x. That is, A n x (t) (resp., S n x (t)) counts how many times players moved into (from) state x during the time interval [0, t],
is the total number of jumps of the process X n,i : i ∈ [n] during [0, t]. The rates of transition of A n x (t) and S n x (t) are, respectively, nλ n x (t) and nσ n x (t), where,
and ν n,♯ (t) = ν n,♯
The term ν n,♯ x (t) stands for the empirical distribution of the rest of the players from the point of view of a player whose state is x. When there are no players at state x a time t, that is ν n x (t) = 0, we get ν n,♯ x (t) = 0. This way, ν n,
and denote M n (t) = (M n x (t) : From the limit √ n(µ n (0) − µ(0)) ⇒ 0 and (2.21),
Simple algebraic manipulations yield that
By Assumption 2.3 and the bound
we obtain that
where in the above expression, and in the rest of the proof, C refers to a finite positive constant that is independent of t and n and which can change from one line to the next. Now, Grönwall's inequality implies that
Since any pair of {A n x , S n y :
Since λ n x and σ n x are uniformly bounded we get that
Therefore, from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality ([26, Theorem 48]), (2.30), (2.27), and Markov inequality we get (2.26). We now study the diffusion scale. From (2.28)
. By Assumption 2.3 and (2.21), it follows from [18, Ch. VI, Corollary 3.33] that it is sufficient to show separately the C-tightness of {M n − N n } and {L n + K n }. We start with {M n − N n }. The Martingale central limit theorem ([12, Ch. 7, Theorem 1.4]), which holds due to (2.26), (2.31), and (2.29), implies that
Therefore, {M n − N n } is C-tight.
We now turn to the C-tightness of {L n + K n }. First, Assumption 2.3, Lemma A.1, and the boundedness of ∇ η α * , as a continuous function, imply,
Next, we wish to bound ψ n (t) . From the definition of L n , the last representation of K n , and again the boundedness of α * and ∇ η α * it follows that L n (t) + K n (t) ≤ C t 0 ψ n (s) ds. Going back to (2.32) and using Grönwall's inequality, we get the following estimation
The tightness of {M n −N n } implies that lim k→∞ lim sup n P sup
Then, together with (2.33) and (2.35), the boundedness of α * and the elements of ∇ η α * , and (2.29), we get that
The last step is to show that any weak limit ψ of ψ n satisfies (2.24). Since {(ψ n , M n − N n , L n + K n )} is tight it has a convergence subsequence, which we relabel as {n}, with limit
From (2.26), we get that (ν n , ν n,♯ ) converges in probability to (µ, µ). Therefore,
In case that Assumption 3.1 does not hold, using merely the Lipschitz-continuity of a * , the approximation (2.35) to (2.34) is replaced by the bound
for some constant C > 0 independent of n and t. The boundedness of a * implies the same bound for L n (t). Now from (2.32), Grönwall's inequality, and the C-tightness of {M n − N n }, we obtain (2.23). ✷
Sufficient conditions for Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
In this section we show that a variant of the conditions imposed in [14] are sufficient for Assumptions 2.1-2.3 to hold. Throughout this process we explicitly show how to derive the master equation from the MFG. For the sake of presentation we fully detail the required conditions. Assumption 3.1 1. (control set) The minimal rate of transition allowed from one state to another is positive.
(separation) The function f can be expressed as
3. (Lipschitz-continuity) The functions f 2 and g are differentiable w.r.t. η and there exists a constant c L such that for every
(convexity)
There exists a constant c V > 0 such that for every
(superlinearity) For every
From the representation of f it follows that H(x, η, p) = H 1 (x, p) + f 2 (x, η), where H 1 (x, p) := inf a {f 1 (x, a) + y,y =x a y p y }, and the infimum is taken over the controls that satisfy property 1 above.
7. (concavity) For every M > 0 there exists a parameter c M > 0 such that for every
Notice that Assumption 3.1 imply the conditions given in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. The first two conditions in Assumption 3.1 are in force in [4] . These are the only assumptions that are stronger than the conditions from Lemma 2.1 and Remark 2.1. As a result, the only missing parts from Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are that the master equation (ME) has a unique classical solution with a Lipschitz gradient. The next theorem states that this condition holds as well.
Before stating the theorem, we provide an example that satisfies the conditions of Assumption 3.1. and
Theorem 3.1 Under Assumption 3.1 the master equation (ME) admits a unique classical solution and the function ∇ η U is continuous over
Notice that the theorem states that ∇ η U is continuous, which is stronger then merely bounded as stated in Assumption 2.2.2. The proof of the theorem is done in several steps and is given after a few preliminaries lemmas. In the rest of this section we assume that Assumption 3.1 is in force. The proof is inspired by [4] and its idea is as follows. We first consider the forward-backward system given in (2.9), and use its solution to define a function U . We show that U is differentiable w.r.t. the measure component and satisfies the master equation (ME). Finally, we show its regularity. The function u(t, x) stands for V α (t, x, µ(t)) from (2.9). Recall the notation from Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.1 and set the function α :
) and consider the forward-backward system:
where u :
. This system has a unique solution, see [14, Theorem 4] . We now introduce another forward-backward system, which later on will be shown to be associated with the measure-gradient of U . Set (t 0 , m 0 ) ∈ [0, T ] × R d and consider a solution to (3.2) , denoted by (u, m) associated with the initial condition µ(t 0 ) = µ 0 ∈ P([d]).
Clearly, there is a unique m that satisfies the first equation and as a result a unique v that satisfies the second equation. Throughout this section we use the notation
The next lemma provides sensitivity result for the last two systems.
. Let (u, µ) and (û,μ) be two solutions to (3.2) with the initial conditions µ(t 0 ) = µ 0 andμ(t 0 ) =μ 0 . Also, let (v, m) and (v,m) be two solutions to (3.3) associated with(u, µ) and (û,μ), respectively and satisfying the initial conditions m(t 0 ) = m 0 andm(t 0 ) =m 0 . Then, there is a constant C > 0 independent of t 0 , t 0 , µ 0 , andμ 0 , such that
From Assumption 2.2.3 and Grönwall's inequality, for every t ∈ [t 0 , T ],
, where here and in the rest of the proof, C refers to a finite positive constant that is independent of t 0 ,t 0 , µ 0 , andμ 0 which can change from one line to the next. Now, by [14, Equation (20) ], Assumptions 3.1.6 and 3.1.7 imply that for every t ∈ [t 0 , T ],
Integrating both sides and recalling Assumption 3.1.6, we obtain
Plugging this into (3.6), we get that
Since α and µ are bounded, μ(
From the Lipschitz continuity of p → H 1 (·, p), η → f 2 (·, η), and η → g(·, η) (see Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 2.2.4, which follows from the former) and Grönwall's inequality, it follows from (3.2) that sup
Another application of the Lipschitz-continuity of the functions H 1 and f 2 together with the last inequality implies
Similarly, the Lipschitz-continuity and boundedness of α together with (3.7) implies ·) ) , which in turn implies (3.4) .
We omit the proof of (3.5), which is similar and uses the boundedness of α and ∇ η f 2 (which follows from its continuity over its compact domain) and the Lipschitz-continuity of α, ∇ η f 2 , and ∇ η g. ✷ Recall that the space of continuously differentiable functions φ : [0, T ] → R k for some k ∈ N, with the norm sup [0,T ] ( φ(t) + φ ′ (t) ) is a Banach space and therefore complete, see e.g., [17, Example 5.4] . Denote this space by C 1 ([0, T ], R k ). The stability of the solution of (3.3) is now discussed. Consider a sequence {(
that converges to (t 0 , µ 0 , m 0 ) and respectively let (u k , µ k ) and (v k , m k ) be the solutions of (3.2) and (3.3), associated with the initial conditions µ k (t 0 ) = µ k 0 and m k (t 0 ) = m k 0 . Then, (3.4) implies that {(u k , µ k )} k∈N is a Cauchy sequence in C 1 ([0, T ], R 2d ); we refer to u and µ as function from [0, T ] to R d , where u(t) := (u(t, x) : x ∈ [d]). Therefore its limit exists, belongs to the same space, and solves (3.2) with the initial condition µ(t 0 ) = µ 0 . Denote the limit by (u, µ). The same type of arguments, together with the last limit yields also that (v, m) := lim k (v k , m k ) exists and solves (3.3) with the data (u, µ) and the initial condition m(t 0 ) = m 0 .
The next lemma connects the functions u and v. [û(t, y) − u(t, y)]α xy (µ(t), ∆ x u(t, ·)) + H 1 (x, ∆ xû (t, ·)) − H 1 (x, ∆ x u(t, ·)) + f 2 (x,μ(t)) − f 2 (x, µ(t)) − (μ(t) − µ(t)) · ∇ η f 2 (x, µ(t)), c(x) : = g(x,μ(T )) − g(x, µ(T )) − ∇ η g(T, µ(T ))(m(T ) − m(T )).
The proof uses the boundedness of α,μ, ∇ η f 2 , and ∇ η g, the Lipschitz-continuity of α, H 1 , f 2 , and g, and Lemma 3. where u µ 0 solves (3.2) with the initial condition µ(t 0 ) = µ 0 . We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Differentiability: From Lemma 3.2 and (3.9) we obtain that U (t 0 , ·,μ 0 ) − U (t 0 , ·, µ 0 ) − K(t 0 , x, µ 0 ) · (μ 0 − µ 0 ) ≤ C μ 0 − µ 0 , and therefore, the function U is differentiable w.r.t. the measure component and ∇ η U (t 0 , x, µ 0 ) = K(t 0 , x, µ 0 ). Moreover, from (3.10), we get the continuity of ∇ η U . Satisfying (ME): In this part we show that U satisfies (ME). Clearly, 1 h (U (t 0 + h, x, µ 0 ) − U (t 0 , x, µ 0 )) = 1 h (U (t 0 + h, x, µ 0 ) − U (t 0 + h, x, µ(t 0 + h))) (3.11) + 1 h (U (t 0 + h, x, µ(t 0 + h)) − U (t 0 , x, µ 0 )). ∇ η U (t 0 + h, x, µ s ) · (α ⊤ (µ(t), ∆ x U (t, ·, µ(t)))µ(t))dtds,
where the matrix α ⊤ is the transpose of α. For the last equality we used the differential equation for µ from (3.2) and that ∆ x u(t, ·) = ∆ x U (t, ·, µ(t)). Recall (3.10), taking lim h→0 on both sides, we get that where in the last equality we used the differential equation for u from (3.2), that H = H 1 + f 2 , and again the identity ∆ x u(t 0 , ·) = ∆ x U (t 0 , ·, µ 0 ). Combining the last two limits with (3.11), we get that ∂ t U (t 0 , x, µ 0 ) exists and that (ME) holds. Uniqueness: We now show that the master equation (ME) had a unique solution. Let U be a solution of the master equation, we show thatŨ = U . → R byũ(t, x) =Ũ (t, x,μ(t)). Then, using (3.12) and the fact thatŨ solves (ME), we get that ∂ tũ (t, x) = ∂Ũ (t, x,μ(t)) + ∇ ηŨ (t, x,μ(t)) · ∂ tμ (t) = H 1 (x, δ xũ (t, ·)) + f 2 (x,μ(t)).
That is (ũ,μ) is a solution to (3.2), which by Lemma 3.1 has a unique solution. Therefore, u = u and as a consequenceŨ = U and uniqueness of the solution of the master equation is established.
